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Quasi-Fiscal Activity in the Energy Sector in Belarus 
 
Summary 
By maintaining administratively set prices in the energy sector at levels below the re-
covery cost, tolerance to low bill collection rates and excessive operational loses (in-
cluding theft) the many CIS countries implicitly subsidize domestic energy users. Such 
indirect subsidy schemes are termed “quasi-fiscal activities” (QFA). This paper aims to 
produce the estimation of the QFA in the Belarusian energy sector. 
The main finding of the paper is that in 2006 QFAs in the energy sector were sizable 
and reached 3.7–4.7% of GDP, mainly due to mispricing in the electricity sector. Tak-
ing into consideration that after the gas price hike in 2007 the cross-subsidization in 
electricity went up; a further increase in QFAs in 2007 is most likely. 
QFAs undermine macroeconomic stability and represent an obstacle for Belarusian en-
ergy sector development. While the sector faces problems related to aging industrial 
capacities, the existing tariff schemes do not ensure proper infrastructure investment 
incentives. On the other hand, elimination of the QFAs critically depends on a compre-
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1. Introduction 
The energy sector in Belarus is characterised by slow progress in reforms, domination 
of vertically integrated state-owned monopolies with weak corporate governance 
structures and the lack of an independent regulator. By maintaining administratively 
set prices of natural gas and electricity for some domestic users, i.e. agriculture and 
households at levels that do not recover full cost, authorities implicitly subsidize them. 
Such government-sponsored subsidy schemes coupled with tolerating non payment 
for consumed energy and excessive losses or theft can be described as quasi-fiscal ac-
tivities (QFA) in the energy sector. 
QFA not only cause inefficiencies in the sector but may also undermine macroeco-
nomic stability. Belarus’ energy sector faces problems related to aging industrial ca-
pacities, while existing tariff schemes do not ensure proper infrastructure investment 
incentives. Moreover, administrative energy prices are major obstacles for private in-
vestment in the energy sector. Furthermore, QFA leads to overconsumption and waste 
of resources, which result in high energy-intensity of the economy. It hampers effi-
cient resource allocation by supporting loss-making enterprises and taking away pub-
lic resources from priority needs. QFA is an obstacle on the way of structural changes 
of the economy as it cuts the incentives to restructure for companies. 
The analysis is organised as follows. Section 2 comprises conceptual and methodologi-
cal issues related to QFA in the energy sector and major mechanisms by which the 
energy sector fulfils its quasi-fiscal role. Section 3 produces the estimation of QFA in 
Belarus. Section 4 discusses macroeconomic implications of QFA. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Quasi-Fiscal Activity in the Energy Sector: Methodological Issue 
The concept of quasi-fiscal activity (QFA) was put forward in the IMF policy papers 
and refers to operations that “could in principal be duplicated by specific budgetary 
measures in the form of an explicit tax, subsidy, or other direct expenditure”.1 IMF 
Manual on Fiscal Transparency defines QFA as operations that result in a net transfer 
of public resources through nonbudget channels.2 
The most extensively researched QFAs are those conducted by financial institutions, 
while other activities including those in the energy sector have been less intensively 
investigated. This is partly due to the unavailability and inaccuracy of the data re-
quired for quantitative analysis. However, quasi-fiscal activities in the energy sector 
are widespread in transition and some developing countries. In Belarus, as in any 
other CIS country, energy pricing inherited from the soviet past; where prices did not 
reflect cost but were set to attain certain social goals such as affordability of energy 
for households or the survival of (often inefficient) companies.3 
In the energy sector different practices of QFAs can be identified4: setting tariffs below 
cost recovery level, tolerate the build-up of arrears to energy companies as a result of 
non-payments or payments are not being made in full, excessive losses or theft, non-
cash payments and government guaranteed borrowing. The estimation of each of 
these subcomponents is challenging due to lack of information, reluctance of state-
owned energy enterprises to provide the necessary data (insisting that those are 
commercially sensitive), non-use of generally accepted accounting principles, etc. 
                                      
1 Mackenzie, G.A., Peter Stella (1996). Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Public Financial Institutions. IMF Occa-
sional Paper No. 142. 
2 IMF (2001). Manual on Fiscal Transparency, Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
3 IMF, et al.(1991). A Study of the Soviet Economy, Vol. 3, Paris: OECD.  
4 Petri M., Taube G., and Tsyvinski A. (2002). Energy Sector Quasi-Fiscal Activities in the Countries of the 
Former Soviet Union. IMF Working Paper. WP/02/60. 
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There are two ways to evaluate QFAs in the energy sector5, the end product and the 
financial balance approach. 
2.1. End-Product Approach 
a) Mispricing 
If governments in the CIS countries maintain administratively set prices of natural gas 
or electricity at levels below cost the energy supply companies subsidize the consum-
ers with: 
 QFP = (P – PA)*V, (1) 
where QFP is the quasi-fiscal activity on account of mispricing; P – the cost-recovery 
tariff; PA – the actual tariff; and V – the output of electricity or gas. (Assuming that 
the market clearing volume at cost recovering prices is lower (i.e., volumes are price-
elastic) and that unit-production cost increase with volume (i.e., increasing marginal 
cost), the loss of the energy supply companies exceeds QFP.) 
b) Arrears 
If end-users of gas or electricity do not pay the revenue losses of energy companies 
equals: 
 QFR = (1 – R)*PA*V,  (2) 
where R is payment collection ratio, that range from 0 to 1. 
c) Excessive losses and theft 
Revenue losses due to mispricing and toleration of low bill collection result in ineffi-
ciencies on the supply side (poor maintenance, technical problems in transmission and 
distribution, inadequate metering or billing practices, etc.). Consequently technical 
energy losses exceed the “normative”6 level. The extent of excessive losses can be 
estimated by comparing total losses (including normative and excessive) with the 
loss-factors that would be normally expected, e.g. estimates from countries with com-
petitive energy sectors. 
 QFL = V*((L – LN)/100) or  
 QFL = V*((L – LB)/100) (3) 
where L denotes total losses LN is normative losses, LB – benchmark losses (market 
economy estimations). Losses are estimated as a percentage of production. 
In sum, total quasi-fiscal activity equals: 
 QFA = QFP+ QFR+ QFL (4) 
2.2. Financial Balance Approach 
If actual revenues of an energy company are insufficient to cover its expenses, and if 
it does neither obtains explicit subsidies from the state budget nor has sufficient ac-
cess to the capital market, one alternative might be running arrears. 
Payment arrears relate to delayed or incomplete input payments: 
 AQ = (1 – RQ)*Q (5) 
where Q is total amount that has to be paid for inputs; RQ – inputs payment ratio that 
range from 1 to 0. 
                                      
5 Petri, M., Taube, G., and Tsyvinski, A. (2002). Energy Sector Quasi-Fiscal Activities in the Countries of 
the Former Soviet Union. IMF Working Paper. WP/02/60.  
6 ”Normative” losses are technical waste of production due to transformation leakage. 
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In the case of partial payment of taxes, energy enterprises’ tax arrears are equal to: 
 AT = (1 – RT)*T  (6) 
where T is total amount of taxes that need to be paid, RT – ratio of tax payment that 
range from 1 to 0. 
Future generation arrears or underinvestment into maintenance and replacement of 
fixed assets or capacity expansion are as follows: 
 AI = (1 – RI)*I (7) 
where I denotes necessary amount of investments, RI – ratio relation between needed 
and actual investments that that range from 1 to 0. 
 Mispricing of inputs in the case when such inputs are energy products (e.g. petro-
leum) is considered by Petri, Taube, and Tsyvinski (2002) as another subcomponent 
of QFAs, while Tchaidze (2007) does not take it into account : 
 MPI = QEI * (PMI – PAI)  (8) 
where QEI is quantity of energy used as an input, PMI – the market or cost recovery 
input price, PAI – the actual input price. 
Total quasi-fiscal activity equals: 
 QFA = MPI + AQ + AT + AI. (9) 
The unavailability of data on financial accounts of energy enterprises, does not allow 
us to estimate QFAs in the Belarusian energy sector using financial balance approach, 
therefore, in calculations we utilizes the methodology that bases on end-product ap-
proach. 
It should be noted that the quasi-fiscal activity concept differs from the quasi-fiscal 
deficit (QDF). The later is the losses incurred by quasi-fiscal activities.7 For example, 
in the case of cross subsidization QFA may be larger than QDF or they can offset each 
other. The quasi-fiscal deficit will be equal to zero, if in the country electricity or gas 
are sold to households at prices below cost-recovery level, while prices for industrial 
consumers exceed this level, and are sufficiently high to cover the difference between 
the hypothetical value of domestically sold energy products for households valued at 
the cost recovery prices and the actually collected revenue. However, it would be 
QFAs amount to implicit quasi-fiscal subsidy to population. There also might be a 
situation when quasi-fiscal subsidy to households is equal to QDF, or quasi-fiscal defi-
cit is smaller than QFAs.8 For reasons of data availability this paper limits its scope to 
the assessment of QFA rather than QFD. 
3. Estimation of the Quasi-Fiscal Activity in the Energy Sector in Belarus 
In general, the energy sector includes the electricity, gas, oil, coal and parts of the 
utilities (e.g. district heating) sector. For reasons of data availability this paper limits 
its scope to the electricity, the gas and the heating sector. 
This section estimates the QFAs based on the end-product approach and taking into 
account that there are no reliable estimations on cost recovery prices and non-
payment rates in the heating sector. 
                                      
7Le Houerou P., Sierra H. (1993). Estimating Quasi-Fiscal Deficit in a Consistency Framework: The Case 
of Madagascar. WB Working Paper. WP 1105 
8 Petri M., Taube G., and Tsyvinski A. (2002), Energy Sector Quasi-Fiscal Activities in the Countries of the 
Former Soviet Union. IMF Working Paper. WP/02/60. 
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3.1. Electricity sector Quasi-Fiscal Activity 
Mispricing 
The assessment of mispricing critically depends on estimating reliable cost recovery 
prices. Petri, Taube, and Tsyvinski (2002) pointed out that “in the case of natural gas 
and electricity, estimating mispricing is necessarily subject to great uncertainty and 
judgment, as any quantitative analysis is based on hypothetical benchmark prices. 
The results of such analyses tend to be quite sensitive to change in these bench-
marks”. For example, the Belarusian Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Economy 
made different estimations of the level of cost coverage for households in the energy 
sector. According to Belarusian Ministry of Economy assessments, in January 2007 the 
cost coverage ratio for natural gas was 157%, whereas the Ministry of Energy consid-
ered that it was 115%. Such discrepancy was observed in evaluations of energy tariffs 
for electricity as well. The Ministry of Energy assessed the tariffs for households 7% 
below the cost recovery level, while the Ministry of Economy estimated the level of 
coverage at 115%. 
In the case of electricity we use the cost recovery level provided by the Ministry of 
Energy for all users (Table 1). Yet, it should be noted that cost recovery levels for 
consumer groups differ, e.g. transmission and distribution cost for industrial users 
that are often connected to the high-voltage grid are significantly lower than those for 
households connected to low voltage distribution grids. However such detailed cost 
recovery estimations for different Belarusian groups of electricity users are not avail-
able. In addition, cost recovery level used in the assessment of QFA does not include 
the reproduction of capital. Therefore, the estimates of the prices necessary to re-
cover electricity supply cost are systematically below long-run marginal cost (LRMC). 
Table 1: Electricity production costs and prices  
for different groups of consumers (US cents per kWh) 
 
As of Jan 
2003 
As of Jan 
2004 
As of Jan 
2005 






Costs  2.32 3.21 3.50 4.40 5.86 n/a 
Prices for:       
 State financed organizations  3.00 4.02 4.02 4.90 7.15 10.2 




 Households  2.39 3.32 3.45 4.09 5.23 5.23 
 Agriculture  2.44 2.66 2.66 2.90 4.32 5.18 
 Other enterprises  4.41 6.02 6.02 6.70 9.21 -- 
Source: The Ministry of Energy. 
We compare the actual price paid by different consumer groups with the cost recovery 
level estimated by the Ministry of Energy. Table 1 show that the residential tariff and 
the tariff for agricultural producers were cross-subsidized by higher industrial tariff. 
However, according to the WB estimations and current practice of several OECD coun-
tries, where prices reflect the relative costs of supply, average residential electricity 
prices should be about twice the level paid by industrial consumers (Table 2). 
In Belarus the ratio of household tariff to industrial tariff in electricity was 58%, while 
in 2007 the situation even worsen and the household electricity price was 50 percent 
or less of the industrial average (Table 3). According EBRD estimations, to cover the 
Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) of production, electricity bills would need to increase 
to 6.6 % of household income. In 2006 the share of utility bills in the overall expendi-
tures of Belarusian households was around 6%, and it decreased to 5% in 2007. 
                                      
9 The electricity tariff for industrial consumers that use high voltage grids (above 750kVA) is 8.68 US 
cents per kWh, while those who use grids below 750kVA is 10.2 US cents per kWh. Therefore, the 
weighted average tariff in the industry is 8.91 US cents per kWh 
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Table 2: Retail Energy Prices in Selected Countries (USD/unit) 
 Nat Gas for Industry 
(107 kcal GCV(e)) 
Nat Gas for Households 
(107 kcal GCV(e))  
Electricity for Industry 
(kWh)  
Electricity for House-
holds (kWh)  
Austria -- 902.90  0.13  0.20  
Czech Republic 366.34  531.09  0.11  0.14  
Denmark -- 1270.76  0.08 0.32  
Finland 251.56  361.19  0.08  0.14  
France 393.69  751.77  0.05  0.15  
Germany -- -- 0.08  0.21  
Greece 379.06  604.68  0.07  0.11  
Hungary 535.60  585.01  0.13  0.17  
Ireland -- 863.17  0.15  0.23  
Japan 401.53  1245.56  0.12  0.19  
Netherlands 227.77  1 015.82  -- 0.27  
Norway -- -- 0.06  0.12  
Poland 337.45  577.20  0.08  0.13  
Portugal 425.81  1 022.39  0.12  0.20  
Slovak Republic 398.25  618.77  0.13  0.17  
Spain 373.18  840.73  0.09  0.16 
Switzerland 566.75  850.61  0.08  0.13 
United Kingdom 379.48  801.12  0.13  0.22  
United States 304.93  464.33  0.06  0.10  
Note. Data provided for the 1st quarter 2007. 
Source: Key World Energy Statistics, IEA 2007. 
Table 3: Ratio of Household Tariff to Industrial Tariff for Electricity and Gas 
Sector  2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 2007 
Gas  0.51  1.03  0.79  0.80  0.80 0.78 
Electricity  0.34  0.76  0.61  0.58  0.58 0.49 
Source: World Bank (2006), own estimations. 
Hence, in 2006 industrial users, who had a tariff well above cost recovery level, paid 
implicit tax and cross-subsidized retail users and agriculture. In their turn, according 
to our estimation households received a quasi-fiscal subsidy equal to 0.9% of GDP, 
while for agriculture it was 0.6% of GDP. Therefore gross QFA in the electricity sector 
due to mispricing was 1.5% of GDP. However, according to data from the Ministry of 
Energy the cost recovery level in electricity was 4.45 US cents in 2006 while average 
tariff amounted 4.12 US cents. In this case the QFA related to mispricing of electricity 
was even higher (2.5% of GDP). 
Arrears 
In Belarus the payment discipline improved over the past years and in 2006 collection 
rate reached 100.3% (consumers paid back part of the previous year’s debts), elimi-
nating QFAs in the electricity sector. However, despite the progress in collection of 
current bills, the electricity sector faces a problem of past arrears (Table 4) that 
amounted to 0.6% of GDP in 2006. The main debtors of Belenergo are the companies 
of the Ministry of Agriculture (accounting for 62% of all debts to Belenergo). 
Table 4: Debts for electricity consumption (USD mln) 
 
As of January 1, 
2003 
As of January 1, 
2004 
As of January 1, 
2005 
As of January 1, 
2006 
As of January 1, 
2007 
Total, including 812.60 721.38 331.48 293.92 222.52 
Domestic consumers 758.59 692.25 328.62 293.92 222.52 
Foreign consumers  54.01 29.13 2.86 -- -- 
Source: The Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
Losses, including theft 
According to Belenergo’s Annual Reports the level of losses in 2006–2007 was around 
11.2% mainly due to commercial losses and inappropriate billing practice (weakness 
in billing coverage), the absence of meters for measuring actual consumption. Since 
the data for 2006 is not available, we assume the same level of losses, as there was 
no information indicating that the situation has been considerably improved. The 
 7 
benchmark level of losses (around 8%10) has been taken from OECD countries that 
have competitive electricity sectors. By comparing the level of losses in Belarus with 
this benchmark level we estimated the extent of excessive technical and commercial 
losses and the scope of related QFAs, which appeared to be around 0.24% of GDP. 
3.2. Gas sector Quasi-Fiscal Activity 
Mispricing 
According to data provided by the Ministry of Energy in the gas sector the main source 
of mispricing was liquefied gas, the price for which was set 30% below cost recovery 
level. Therefore, we estimated QFAs from gas mispricing at 0.1% of GDP. In addition, 
some preferential prices at a level of about 50–80% of the official price were kept for 
some selected enterprises (Belenergo, some state plants of chemistry, peat, light, 
porcelain and other industries).11 However, due to the lack of data the scope of such 
QFAs are difficult to measure. 
Arrears 
The same as in the electricity sector in 2006 the bill collection in gas sector was 100% 
and the arrears mainly related to debts accumulated in past periods (table 5). These 
cumulative arrears were equal to 3.5% of GDP in 2006. 
Table 5: Arrears for natural gas (USD mln)  
 
As of January 1, 
2003 
As of January 1, 
2004 
As of January 1, 
2005 
As of January 1, 
2006 
As of January 1, 
2007 
Total, including 874.11 708.16 248.66 186.05 131.03 
Arrears of domestic consumers 774.63 594.48 247.51 186.05 131.03 
External consumers  99.48 113.68 -- -- -- 
Source: The Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
3.3. Heating sector Quasi-Fiscal Activity 
Mispricing 
For the purpose of this study we use the cost recovery estimates provided by the Min-
istry of Energy. On average the price for heating was only 72% of cost recovery level 
and brought about QFA of 1% of GDP. 
Losses 
Officially declared level of losses in the heating network was around 9.9%, while some 
experts insisted that it was considerably higher. According to some sources losses in 
distribution amounted to 15–25% of heat supply, compared with 5% in Western Euro-
pean systems. We use the official level of losses for estimation of QFA, which was 
0.3% of GDP in 2006. 
The analysis has shown that QFAs in the energy sector was sizable and reached 3.1–
4.1% of GDP in 200612, mainly caused by mispricing in the electricity sector (Table 6). 
Taking into consideration that after the gas price hike in 2007 the cross-subsidization 
in electricity went up, a further increase in QFAs is most likely. 
Table 6: Quasi-Fiscal Activity in the Belarusian Energy Sector (% of GDP) 
 Mispricing Arrears Losses Total 
Electricity 1.5–2.5 -- 0.24 1.74–2.74 
Gas 0.1 -- n/a 0.1 
Heating 1.0 n/a 0.3 1.3 
Total QFA 2.6–3.6 -- 0.54 3.14–4.14 
Source: own estimations. 
                                      
10 International Energy Agency. 
11 IPM research Center (2007) Belarusian Infrastructure Monitoring, www.research.by. 
12 In 2005 the World Bank estimated QFA in electricity and gas sector at around 0.5% of GDP. See: 
World Bank (2006), Belarus: Addressing Challenges Facing the Energy Sector. 
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4. Macroeconomic implications of QFAs 
Affecting the real and the financial side of economy, QFAs may have significant mac-
roeconomic implications. Inadequate prices on energy products cut the incentives for 
their efficient use and lead to wasteful consumption. As a result the energy intensity 
of the Belarusian economy is very high by international standards.13 
Improper energy prices do not send the correct signals to enterprises undermining 
their incentives to restructure. Implicit subsidies provided through mispricing support 
loss-making enterprises and thus take away public resources from priority needs. On 
the other hand, maintaining administratively set energy prices at the level that does 
not offset the recovery costs result in underinvestments and depletion of the capital 
stock in the energy sector. 
Cross subsidization, such as setting energy prices below-cost recovery level for 
households, at the expense of industrial consumers (who pay higher tariffs) distorts 
the price structure in the whole and erodes competitiveness of enterprises in external 
markets. In addition, since such quasi-fiscal subsidy to population is untargeted it dis-
guises governments’ social policies. Yet, QFAs in the energy sector are quite inefficient 
instrument of social policy as well-off households, which consume more energy and 
utility services, receive more benefits from subsidization.14 
If end-users do not pay for gas and electricity the energy sector enterprises can start 
to run arrears on their obligations towards their suppliers and budget (tax authori-
ties), and finally get involved into mutual arrears. In that case, the government will 
have to provide loans or subsidies to the energy enterprises, which may result in high 
rates of inflation. 
Subsidies, that government may have to extend to the energy sector in order to re-
solve the problem with payment arrears and heavy debt accumulation would typically 
increase the vulnerability of the budget. Besides, budget revenues and fiscal stance 
can be negatively affected by tax arrears of the energy sector, e.g. after the import 
gas price hike in Ukraine, the tax arrears of Naftogaz (which was not allowed to im-
mediately raise consumer prices) amounted to 1 percent of GDP in 2006.15 
In general, QFAs in the energy sector bring about intransparency and distort the pic-
ture of the government’s true fiscal position, which may cause inappropriate fiscal 
policies. 
Energy subsidies can be financed by accumulating external state debt, thus worsening 
the external sustainability position and possibly impeding access to international capi-
tal markets. For example, after gas price hike in 2007 Belarusian government ap-
proached Russia several times with the request of USD 1.5 bn loan for stabilization 
purpose. 
There are some other adverse effects of QFAs worth to be mentioned, e.g. poor main-
tenance, technical problems in transmission and distribution are dangerous for envi-
ronment and may end up with ecological catastrophe; toleration of arrears can result 
in spreading of nonpayment practice to other areas and can create moral hazard prob-
lems, poor quality of the energy and utility system decrease the living standards of 
population.16 
                                      
13 Tochitskaya I. (2006) The Macroeconomic Impact of Gas Price Increase in Belarus: Quantitative As-
sessment, PP/10/06, IPM Research Center, www.research.by. 
14 See, Freinkman, L., Gyulumyan, G., and Kyurumyan A. (2003). Quasi-Fiscal Activities, Hidden Gov-
ernment Subsidies, and Fiscal Agenda in Armenia, World Bank Working paper, 16, Washington, DC. 
15 IMF (2007). Ukraine Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 07/47. 
16 Freinkman, L., Gyulumyan, G., and Kyurumyan A. (2003). Quasi-Fiscal Activities, Hidden Government 
Subsidies, and Fiscal Agenda in Armenia, World Bank Working paper, 16, Washington, DC. 
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5. Conclusions 
The estimation has shown that QFAs in the energy sector was sizable and reached 
3.1–4.1% of GDP in 2006. The significant increases in prices of natural gas sold by 
Gazprom to Belarus in 2007 posed new challenges to domestic energy market. The 
reluctance to pass through all the increases to final consumers meant that most likely, 
Belarus will also face expansion of QFAs mainly on account of mispricing and increase 
in cross subsidization not only between households and industrial consumers but 
within industry by formation of the privileged group of enterprises that buy energy or 
gas at the below-cost recovery prices. In addition, taking into consideration that 
nowadays the depreciation of capital assets in the energy sector is more than 64%, 
mispricing will hamper the renovation of fixed assets and inevitably will result in 
higher excessive losses. 
QFAs turned to be a very serious problem on both, macro and micro levels. On macro 
level it hampered and distorted financial flows and macroeconomic stability, posing an 
additional burden on the budgets and in some cases leading to rising foreign indebt-
edness. On the micro level the energy sector in Belarus needs considerable invest-
ments, and private sector is not eager to come due to state price regulations. Energy 
sector deficit was financed primary through direct government’ subsidies, default on 
payables, the depletion of existing energy sector assets, and poor quality of service to 
customers. 
QFAs remain to be an obstacle for the Belarusian energy sector development. On the 
other hand, limited progress in the energy sector reforms result in the instability of 
the top-down trend to reduce or eliminate QFAs, which therefore might easily be re-
versed. As it was shown by the Ukraine experience, an external energy shock in the 
form of increased gas prices resulted in the expansion of mispricing practice and in-
creasing toleration of arrears that together led to an increase in QFAs. Thus, elimina-
tion of the QFAs critically depend on energy sector reforms that should be put at the 
centre of overall reform agenda. 
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